Simon Duffy

Thoughts, Bemusements & Arguments

Tag: rights

Czars, Commissioners or Just Us?

For readers outside the UK I must do some scene-setting. In 2011 the television documentary programme Panorama did an exposé on the crimes committed against people with learning disabilities at Winterbourne View, a private hospital in South Gloucestershire. This was the first time in a long while that people with learning disabilities had come the attention of the UK’s mainstream media.

In fact my own emotional response to the crimes at Winterbourne View may seem peculiar. I wasn’t shocked by the abuse scandal. I was glad that this long-running scandal had finally been revealed. Places like Winterbourne View have been around since the early 1990s and this kind of abuse is typical of what happens in those kinds of systems. In fact, when carrying out some research in South West England, I met several families whose children had been at Winterbourne View and they said that it was the ‘least bad place’ that their children had been forced to live.

I am sure that most professionals working in the system know that these things have been happening and have been happening for a long time. Certainly my own work has been inspired by a strong desire to get rid of such institutions and to ensure people are treated as citizens instead.

The physical and mental torture imposed on people at Winterbourne View isn’t even the worst of the crimes committed against people with learning disabilities. Far too many people die, either because of abuse, poor healthcare, over-medication or negligence. The fact that there are now some powerful advocacy groups putting pressure on the Government over these issues is one of the few bright spots in an otherwise bleak scene. The UK Government is getting away with cuts in support, cuts in housing, cuts in income and cuts in employment for people with learning disabilities. But at least it is not quite getting away with funding services where we know people are likely to be tortured and where they may even die.

The irony is that, of all the political problems faced by people with learning disabilities today, this is about the only one that has not caused been by our current extreme right-wing Government.*

These attacks on the lives of people with learning disabilities typify institutional service provision. Long-stay institutions, with their regimes of power and control, encourage criminal and immoral behaviour. Treat people as if they do not belong, treat people as if they are not worthy, are not fully human, then this will be the almost inevitable result. [Not quite inevitable, for nobody is ‘forced’ to act badly; but put people in the wrong environment and the temptations to act badly will grow quickly.]

I have written about this at length in my book The Unmaking of Man.

The first large scale institution to close in England was Darenth Park Hospital in 1988. The last to close, Orchard Hill, was closed in 2010. The Centre has published a number of reports describing these places and the experiences of people and staff.

In international terms England closed its institutions early. However there were many problems that we did not manage to resolve during this process and much of the early momentum towards inclusion ended once the hospitals were closed. Today’s scandals reflect important limits to this early progress:

  • Limited public understanding – Hospital closures were inspired by family advocacy, but largely led by professionals (who were often inspired by Wolf Wolfensberger’s theory of ‘normalisation’). As the process of closure began it also became largely a professional matter – campaigning diminished and the public started to think of deinstitutionalisation as some kind of weird Thatcherite plot. Public understanding of, and commitment to, genuine inclusion has remained weak.
  • Institutional community services – The typical model for post-institutional care has been group home plus day centre. Most people leaving institutions were simply forced into this new (milder) institutional environment. We made the classic mistake of thinking that the institution was the building and we failed to see that we were rebuilding institutions within our communities. Many organisations that had once campaigned and advocated for people’s rights became major service providers.
  • New extreme institutions – Unsurprisingly some people from the old institutions could not ‘fit’ inside the new community institutions. So a profitable business developed as entrepreneurs (often ex-nurses) set up private care homes and hospitals to house those whom this early form deinstitutionalisation had failed. This process had begun by the early 1990s, and these business picked up new ‘clients’ whenever local community services failed to provide the right support. The NHS set also up what it called Assessment and Treatment Units (ATUs) to try and limit this problem, but often these services simply replicated the same problem.
  • Crisis-driven eligibility – While many private and charitable businesses boomed during the period of ‘community care’ there was an on-going failure to address the fundamental issues of rights, power and control that shape the future. Families still face the same fundamentally unfair choice with which they were confronted during the institutional era: either ‘carry on taking care of your child by yourself’ or ‘hand over your child to us’. That is, we have continued to offer families responsibility, with minimal support or to have provided services over which families have had little control.

It is these combined factors that have led to the creation of places like Winterbourne View. When carrying out the research described in Returning Home and Getting There a clear pattern emerged to describe how people ended up in abusive environments costing an average of £175,000 per year:

  1. A family struggles with minimal support and then something happens which brings them to a point of crisis.
  2. At the point of crisis their son or daughter is offered a place in some kind of ‘community institution’ (usually a group home).
  3. The young person hates it; they feel a mixture of anger, sadness or fear and they start doing things to hurt themselves or hurt others.
  4. The young person is deemed to have ‘challenging behaviour’ and is then moved to a more ‘managed environment’ further away from home.
  5. The young person hates that too and so a cycle begins which leads to increasingly professionalised, expensive and institutional services.

So we end up where we are in England today. Not only do we have 3,500 people forced to live in private hospitals and ATUs, we also have about 8,000 people living ‘out of area’ and many thousands more in prison.

And none of this is necessary.

I know this is not necessary, not from theory, but from practical experience. In 1996 I set up a new type of service provider, Inclusion Glasgow. This organisation ended up working with some of the most challenging people leaving the institutions in Scotland. Together with my friends and colleagues we developed a very different kind of deinstitutionalisation process where we provided personalised support:

  • Individual service design – Everybody is treated as a citizen with the right to a home of their own, living with people they choose and living a life that makes sense to them.
  • Empowerment – Power and control is shared with the person and their family to make sure that decisions are made quickly, appropriately and as close to the person as possible.
  • Personal assistance – People get support from the right person for them – recruited by them, employed for them – but with support and employment coming from the organisation.
  • Individualised policies – Rules and ways of working are designed with and around the person to keep them and everyone else safe.
  • Individual Service Fund – People have a personal budget which is protected and can be used to support flexible and creative service design.

Basically our approach was – treat everyone like a unique individual and support people to be full citizens with all the rights of citizenship. This is an approach that works. We went on to help establish two more organisations to carry out this work: Partners for Inclusion and C-Change for Inclusion. We also worked with a network of other smaller and inclusion-focused organisations in Scotland.

But while this process worked it did not really spread very far.

Personally my work from 2000 onwards focused on taking some of the lessons from Inclusion Glasgow into the development of systems of self-directed support. I wanted to help social workers work in the same way that we had – to empower citizens and families and to design support that was flexible and community-focused. First I took the model I’d developed to North Lanarkshire and then I took it to In Control in 2003.

Perhaps negligently, I trusted that the Inclusion Glasgow approach would flourish naturally in the new world of self-directed support. I was clearly wrong.

Reflecting on all of this now some things strike me as worth more attention.

Change requires not just better systems, but real leadership. There has been no significant ‘market’ pressure for real innovation by services. Organisations have been allowed to continue with old forms of practice because commissioners know no better and families have not been encouraged to demand better from service providers. Instead families have simply been encouraged to take over all responsibility – becoming employers, accountants, brokers and innovators – all for free.

The early successes of self-directed support all relied upon the willingness of some families to take this difficult path. It is testament to the power of love and family that so many have succeeded. But why should this be necessary? Why cannot services learn to work with families as true partners?

The other thing that strikes me is our peculiar image of leadership.

From 2001 we had a Learning Disability Czar. Does anyone else not think that this is the strangest choice of language? Why would we think this a useful image of leadership – to be the head of the failed Russian Empire? For me the idea of Czar suggests a range of problems:

  • An enormous faith and power invested in one – democratically unaccountable – individual.
  • The corrupting role of patronage – funding being directed wherever the Czar feels it should be best spent.
  • A culture of submissiveness, solicitation and supplication that inevitably arises around any charmed central figure.

I cannot see why anyone would think this would help. Instead I think the creation of the Czar during the New Labour era helped to put us all to sleep. We learned that obedience and compliance would be rewarded with extra funding. We stopped seeking fundamental legal change, instead we expected wisdom to come down from Central Government. But what in our experience might lead people with learning disabilities and their allies to believe that Government is the font of all wisdom?

In a recent report emerging from the Winterbourne View crisis it is suggested that the answer to our problems might be to appoint a Learning Disability Commissioner. I don’t know about you but the word ‘Commissioner’ always reminds me of Commissioner Gordon in Batman. May be this is preferable to a Czar; but as we already have an enormous ‘care policeman’ in the form of CQC I don’t quite understand how another policeman will help us. Perhaps we do need Batman – but unfortunately I am not sure he is going to swing to our assistance. However a commissioner is certainly more in tune with the austerity era – no money, but perhaps some additional power to bully people.

As with all efforts to centralise power and control, the fundamental flaw in these dreams of Czars, Commissioners or any other such ‘magical leadership’ figures is the notion that transferring power and control away from people, families or communities and towards the new king-pin figure, will improve things. We naively assume that just by creating this king-pin role then it will inevitably be filled by the ideal figure of our dreams. But in reality these characters often make things worse.

In our efforts to improve things for real we must accept that there will be no Batman, no Commissioner and no Czar to solve our problems. Perhaps we need to take responsibility ourselves – in whatever role we find ourselves.

In particular service providers, social workers, advocates and charities need to think about how they can take responsibility for offering people and families much better support. Nothing stops us from offering people personalised support – the power to change things is in our hands. We know – at least many of us do – how to do this better. It’s time to get on with the job at hand.

For myself I’m thinking hard about how the lessons from Inclusion Glasgow and from other forms of personalised support could be shared more effectively in the future. I’m thinking about how families could be given a much better deal in future. I’m thinking about how we might develop the momentum to return to a focus on inclusion and citizenship – not failing services or institutional systems.

* I say ‘extreme’ not only because it’s true, but because our media seems to be branding the current Labour leader as an ‘extreme’ left winger. This seems very peculiar, as his policies seem rather moderate to me, so I use the term simply to try and balance out the impact of media slurs. I encourage any of you so minded to do likewise.

The Marriage on the Mountain – Independent Living and Person-Centred Support

This is my fourth and final blog – written in honour of the Social Care Ideas Factory’s (SCIF) event – We Chose to Climb. This event has been one of the most interesting and positive events that I have ever had the honour of being involved in: great people, great talks and great conversations.

The event was, I think, an effort to bring together many threads of thought and action – and to bring together many different groups. I cannot do justice to the full wonderful human complexity of it all in this short blog; but I did get a feeling that, at last, we might be on the cusp of achieving two important marriages – marriages that have at times seemed so unlikely and yet marriages that would be so natural.

The first potential marriage is between the ideal of independent living and the ideal of person-centred support. These are not quite the same things, and they certainly have rather different histories; but there is, at their heart, such a commonality of purpose, that a marriage could be possible.

Independent living is a philosophy of being and action that has been developed by people with disabilities (for audiences outside the UK) or disabled people (for the UK audience).

[The hazards of forming this previous sentence give some indication of how difficult it is to write about any of these matters in a way that won’t upset someone, but I think it’s important that we remember that these ideas do exist in a global context – particularly as people with disabilities have worked very hard at ensuring that independent living is linked closely to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD).]

People with disabilities have been advocating for independent living for about 50 years – this is not an insignificant period of time.

There are some subtle differences of definition that can occur. Independent living is certainly very closely aligned to the idea of rights. As such it is an assertion that we have socio-economic rights (an idea that the current UK Government seems to have abandoned, but which is fundamental to the UN Charter on Human Rights). But it is also an assertion that these rights have to be sensitive to the many forms of discrimination or disadvantage that occur for people with disabilities. Perhaps most importantly, it is a challenge to the welfare system, that was developed in the era of Human Rights, after World War II, that these rights must be designed in ways which respect individual choices about lifestyle, relationships and identity.

Practically, independent living was the philosophy used, by many people with disabilities, to insist that they should not have to suffer institutional living, just because the welfare state had now absorbed institutional ‘care’ services.

The philosophy of independent living is also closely, sometimes perhaps too closely, identified with all sorts of positive service developments: personal assistance, accessible buildings and transport, direct payments or individual funding. These developments have all been very good, but one danger is that we confuse the philosophy of independent living with a particular mode of living – say, living in your own accessible flat, using direct payments and employing personal assistants. Independent living, in its true sense, means living as you wish, in the way that makes most sense to you, to your relationships, to your community and to your values – it is certainly not a prescribed lifestyle.

The concept of person-centred support is not the same as independent living; its roots are more diverse, and it is rarely treated as an explicit political goal in the same way as independent living has been. The term has taken root in counselling, in support for people with intellectual disabilities and in the world of dementia. As this suggests, it is an approach that seems helpful for people who might be disadvantaged because they have difficulty expressing themselves, making choices or find the right lifestyle for themselves. In practice, whether it is through planning, therapy, conversation or action, it is an effort to respect the identity of a person who might otherwise be ignored and erased from proper consideration.

Now I must be careful here – when I say that these two concepts might marry I do NOT mean that these concepts are the same or that they might be merged into one concept. Anyone who thinks that has not been married or has not paid attention to what a marriage is. A marriage is (or should) be a respectful union of two equals. Marriage involves, negotiation, love, mutual support and joint effort – for a common good. What I mean by marriage is that these two ideas might be used to complement one another and to develop a better understanding of common problems and shared solutions.

However, it is quite natural for many people with disabilities to be suspicious of person-centred support; for it may appear to be yet another ‘trick’ of the professional establishment to prod, poke and interfere with their lives. Accepting person-centred support might appear to be a false and unnecessary admission of weakness: Don’t give me person-centredness, give me control!

Yet the greatest danger of completely rejecting person-centred support is that it can narrow the world of disability considerably. Given natural human diversity and all the inevitable frailty of the human condition – all of us need assistance and those most like to face the barriers of disability are those who need assistance with communication or decision-making, those who are locked in anger, fear or sadness and those who suffering from illness or chronic health conditions. If our idea of disability is dominated only by the image of the wheelchair then the world of disability has been radically reduced.

At the heart of person-centred support is the bold assertion that everyone has value, everyone’s life is meaningful, everyone has something to contribute. This assertion is part philosophy – an ethical commitment to the equal value of all human beings – and part methodology – start by assuming value and you will find it.

So, my claim is, independent living needs person-centred support  because, without it, there is a grave danger that too many people with disabilities will be exiled to a place where they are deemed too disabled to be disabled. This is not right and it not helpful.

I also think that we must be careful not to rely too heavily upon our rights. Rights exist because duties exist – and human history tells us that, far too often, societies can quickly become blind to their duties and responsibilities. An awareness of right and duties does not flourish unless we are also aware of ourselves as interdependent beings, with innate value, and with multiple capacities to contribute – including the contribution to community that we make when we need assistance.

But person-centred support also needs independent living. There is a grave danger that person-centred support – which does just lack the same authentic roots as independent living – will morph into another professionalised approach, and will lose its way. We’ve certainly seen signs of this in England, where the institutionalisation of “person centred plans” as the new “care plans” promised so much, but has delivered so little. Person-centred support can open up new possibilities and offers the means to nurture mutual respect; but it is no replacement for robust rights, collective political action and practical peer support.

So, we can use both ideas, they are not the same, but they each offer something valuable and distinct.

There is a second marriage that would be useful, and that is the marriage of people and professionals. Again I do not mean to abandon the obvious differences that might exist between many millions of people on either side of that line (and the very many who stand with one foot on either side of that line). Self-identification as a person with a disability or in whatever group is useful, remains an essential first step toward claiming our rights. However, there are several reasons why a marriage between such diverse groups, might be advantageous.

First, there is the obvious political issue; for there is currently no assurance that there will be any professional services, of funding for personal assistance or for personal budgets. In England ‘adult social care’ has been cut by 30% in just four years – there is little point debating the niceties of the organisation of ‘adult social care’ or ‘personalisation’ when the whole edifice is crumbling around us.

Second, there is the call from many – both people and professionals – to drop many of the professional barriers, bureaucratic systems and undue regulations that make it more difficult for everyone to lead the best lives they can. These intrusive and ineffective controls have grown progressively over the years as trust between the front-line, management and politicians has declined.

The welfare state has become bureaucratic welfare. This situation will only be reversed when people with disabilities, families and professionals – together – start to insist upon and demonstrate the value of low-bureaucracy solutions.

Third, there is the fact that the capacity to collaborate collectively, across the professional boundary, will unleash some of the greatest innovations, support and community change. I see this in all of the best social innovations today – they are all the combination of a little money, a few employees, and a great release of creative action – rooted in community action.

The challenges of these marriages – of ideas and of people – are tremendous. They mean overcoming decades of mutual suspicion and misunderstanding. It means being able to think about problems from multiple perspectives. It means including others who might seem ‘too different’ to be included. But the risk of not achieving such a marriage is even greater.

Today, at the end of the conference, SCIF launched their next collaborative project – the Sherpas Union. This project will attempt to build an international movement of all those endeavouring to improve lives, for themselves, and for others. Perhaps it could be one means to promote the courtship between these different groups and these different ideas. It’s too early to predict, but I for one will try to do all I can to help out, and I have already applied to join.

On the Mountain – Roles or Relationships

Today the theme of second day of We Chose to Climb was clear and strong – not power – but relationships. The event itself was full of wonderful content – stimulating and moving – and again and again the presenters made the same point: what makes a positive difference is the reality of the relationship between two people.

And, after all – as Nick Andrews said: Who is helping who?

  • If I am Nadia’s personal assistant, am I helping her to get about and to communicate, or is she helping me to learn more and to earn a living?
  • If I am a social worker trying to establish a fair individual budget for Nadia, am I helping her or is she giving me an important paid job and the opportunity to develop?
  • If I am a senior manager organising disability services, am I helping her or is she giving me the means to have status and influence?

The answer is obvious – both are true – we help each other.

But actually that is not the critical question. The critical question is: Do we each behave as if we know that both are true?

I am afraid I have used this quote before – it is one of those observations I find so powerful:

He [Rebbe Shmelke] said: “The rich need the poor more than the poor need the rich. Unfortunately, neither is conscious of it.”

That is, interdependence is the only human reality. But if we don’t see our relationships as interdependent then we run the risk of creating a sense of worthless dependence on the one side and prideful disrespect on the other.

Of course good practitioners and professionals avoid this trap – everyday – they work with proper humility and respect – they understand the value of the other human being – in any circumstance.

What I think Self-Directed Support offers us is the opportunity to be more explicit about the true nature of that relationship. It does not aim to give the people who need assistance undue power over those who support them; instead it is as an effort to ensure that, when you need assistance, then you know that you are entitled to receive it and direct it. Receiving assistance should not feel like getting a charitable gift where the assistance is defined and controlled by someone else.

Rights are not at war with relationships – rights can restore us to proper relationship.

Self-directed support might be said to rebalance power relationships. Or perhaps better, self-directed support gives us the chance to build new forms of power together – in a relationship of equality.

But this is only the first step.

It is the human quality of that relationship that matters.

Sarah Taylor cited Martin Buber, one of the key thinkers of the twentieth century, who proposed that we can distinguish two radically different ways of relating ourselves to others:

The world is twofold for man in accordance with his twofold attitude.
The attitude of man is twofold in accordance with the two basic words he can speak.
The basic words are not single words but word pairs.
One basic world is the word pair I-Thou.
The other basic word is the word pair I-It; but this basic word is not changed when He or She takes the place of It.
Thus the I of man is also twofold.
For the I of the basic word I-Thou is different from that in the basic word I-It.

What Buber argues, in his classic I and Thou, is that there is all the difference in the world between seeing another person as just an object (may be a clever, active or pleasant object) and seeing them as a true person. For Buber this is connected to a theology that sees an element of God in everyone. But, even the non-religious, might recognise that, when we really connect with another person, we must be open to the power – the light – that burns within them.

This may seem a long way from the day-to-day realities of self-directed support, social work or personal assistance. But, up on the mountain, is this not the critical factor:

  • Can we rely on each other?
  • Do we trust each other?
  • Can we listen to each other?
  • Will we look after each other?

As Jamie Andrew explained to us this morning – the mountain can be beautiful, but it can also be a very dangerous place. You can die on the mountain. So – we need each other. But our pre-defined roles and expectations, our processes and our regulations, may simply not hack it on the mountain.

The only true security lies in our relationship with each other.

The First Welfare State

Moreover, philanthropy was an obligation too, since the word ‘zedakah’ meant both charity and righteousness. The Jewish welfare state in antiquity, the prototype of all others, was not voluntary; a man had to contribute to the common fund in proportion to his means, and this duty could be enforced by the courts. Maimonides even ruled that a Jew who evaded contributing according to wealth should be regarded as a rebel and punished accordingly. Other communal obligations included respect for privacy, the need to be neighbourly (i.e. to give neighbours first refusal of adjoining land put up for sale), and strict injunctions against noise, smells, vandalism and pollution.

Communal obligations need to be understood within the assumptions of Jewish theology. The sages taught that a Jew should not regard these social duties as burdens but as yet more ways in which men showed their love for God and righteousness.

Paul Johnson in A History of the Jews (1987)

Paul Johnson’s description of the Jewish Diaspora’s welfare system as the first welfare state may seem unwarranted. All societies are welfare societies – in the sense that all societies involve some kinds of interaction which benefit the welfare of some – if not all. In fact Herodotus describes a wide range of welfare system in his The Histories and The Bible also describes welfare systems that are at least 3,000 years old.

However, while I think that his claim may be hard to prove, it is certainly plausible, because it is based on two essential features of a welfare state – in its full and proper sense – both of which exceed earlier welfare systems.

First a proper welfare state must be built into the fabric of the community’s laws and must distinguish both rights and duties for all citizens. It must not be merely a system of state philanthropy or a system of mutual assistance. It must be underpinned by Law.

Second a proper welfare system must be inspired by Justice. By this I do not mean merely to repeat the first point. Justice excludes eugenic, elitist or discriminatory goals. Justice recognises the innate worth of each individual, in all their diversity. Justice demands deep respect for each individual. This is why the nineteenth century Poor Laws, and the eugenic welfare measures of Hitler do not qualify as welfare states, at least in the sense I am using the term here. In a sense they are anti-welfare states, because they deny the value of each human life. Instead they seek to promote the interests of an elite, a class, a race or some other group.

This explains why the Jewish Diaspora could well have created the first welfare state. For it was a society built, not on power, but only on the Torah – a combination of law and moral vision – united in one religion. Respect for the individual flowed naturally from the worship of God and the acknowledgement of God’s creation of Man ‘in his image’. And paradoxically, as the Diaspora lacked ‘a state’ it could only institute its measures through legally defined and prescribed communal practices – not through mere state coercion.

What can we learn from this?

If we see the ideal welfare state as a communal effort to ensure that each member of the community is bound together in their commitment to safeguard each other’s welfare and to respect each individuals’ worth and potential, then the Jewish example is inspiring. But its challenge is twofold:

If people do not believe that each human being is sacred then the kind of welfare we may seek to advance may not be respectful of human diversity, but may be eugenic, promoting some class, race or other utopian category of conformity. Can secular categories defend what is valuable in human diversity?

If we live with in a society dominated by a powerful state, one where the Law is seen to flow from the state – rather than fixing and limiting the state’s role – then we may find ourselves in a welfare system where those who run the state shape and determine what counts as welfare. Can we run a welfare state without a proper respect for Law?

Arguably this is what we do have: not a welfare state governed by a respect for human rights and Justice; not a welfare state organised to respect those rights and protect the interests of all. Instead we have a welfare state that is too often the tool of a state that doesn’t recognise rights and which pursues its own elitist, and often eugenic, dreamings.

This is not a counsel of despair. People of many religious views and none are capable of respecting human diversity. Societies are capable of respecting Law and protecting themselves from the abuses that flow form the concentration of political power. But we should not be naive. There is nothing ‘natural’ about the welfare state – and if we want the right kind of welfare state we will need to work hard at protecting both the values that underpin it and the institutions that make it possible.

Beyond Rights – Citizenship in the Welfare State

The [new 1834] Poor Law treated the claims of the poor, not as an integral part of the rights of the citizen, but as an alternative to them – as claims which could be met only if the claimants ceased to be citizens in any true sense of the world.

T H Marshall in Citizenship and Social Class 

Marshall, and other advocates of citizenship in the welfare state, often focus their arguments on a justification of our socio-economic rights. They are right to propose that it is very helpful to see ourselves as holding such rights; rightly they refuse to treat the welfare system as a privilege – granted by the wealthy or the powerful.

Welfare systems which are not founded on rights are easily corrupted and will not be sustainable over time.

We can see the difference this makes in practice. In the UK when socio-economic rights are treated as universal (e.g. health and pensions) they seem to gain more support and are better protected from cuts. However when socio-economic rights are poorly defined and targeted, when they are treated as privileges that apply to just a few (e.g. benefits and social care) then they are easily undermined and reduced. Hence social care in England is being cut by over 30% between 2010 and 2015 – an unprecedented cut in welfare spending – but hardly noticed by the media or by the general public.

As the welfare state becomes increasing subject to means-testing, targeting and conditionality the whole edifice will become unstable. In particular some groups will be increasingly perceived as outside the pale of citizenship. People with disabilities, the poor, people with mental health problems, recent immigrants and exiles and many other groups are becoming strangers in their own land.

T H Marshall is of course not to blame for this corruption of the welfare state. But may be it was a mistake to define citizenship too narrowly. Rights are important, but being a citizen is about much more than being a right-holder. We can identify several other dimensions to citizenship:

  1. Citizens are contributors to the public good
  2. Citizens have many rights and duties, independent of their relationship to the state
  3. Citizens are equal
  4. Citizens are not paupers
  5. Citizens are free
  6. Citizens build community together
  7. Citizens rule themselves, though genuinely democratic institutions

1. The virtue of contribution

Positive obligations, like the need to pay our taxes, are more likely to go unrecognised if there is no stress on the virtue of contribution as an aspect of citizenship.

2. The limits of public expenditure

Taxation and public expenditure are not the only means for fulfilling our obligations. It is unhelpful to focus only on the role of the state in adjusting incomes or in providing services. We have other rights and other duties.

Citizens are free and yet bound by a web of obligations to themselves, family, friends, neighbours and the institutions of civil society – as well as their obligation to the state. It is important not to treat our rights (including our socio-economic rights) as merely a function of our willingness to pay taxes. It is critical to the ecology of community to understand the proper role of public expenditure and also to understand how other forms of contribution can develop in harmony with our obligation to pay our taxes.

For example, most support for children and adults who need assistance to grow, flourish and live good lives comes from families. When a parent takes care of their own child they are doing something which is important on very many levels. It is hard to see that there is any benefit in encouraging the parent to stop taking care of their child, go to work, just to earn enough money to pay for someone else to take care of their child.

3. The need for equality

Citizenship demands equality, not absolute equality (which is in fact hostile to citizenship), but a reasonable level of income equality. The focus of utilitarian and liberal theory has been to sacrifice equality to productivity. Even those who argue for equality can fall back on broadly utilitarian arguments which, while not false, somewhat miss their target. While it may be true that inequality is costly even for the wealthy it is somewhat peculiar to appeal to plain self-interest to justify greater equality.

Plato in the Laws [V, 744] suggests that the poorest must be guaranteed a minimum and that the richest must have no more than four times that minimum. For, as all champions of citizenship, like Rousseau, note:

…by equality, we should understand, not that the degrees of power and riches are to be absolutely identical for everybody; but that power shall never be great enough for violence, and shall always be exercised by virtue of rank and law; and that, in respect of riches, no citizen shall ever be wealthy enough to buy another, and none poor enough to be forced to sell himself.

Rousseau, The Social Contract.

The requirement for relative equality for citizens is based upon the justified belief that high levels of relative inequality distort human relationships and make it harder for people to see each other as equals or to treat each other as equals. It is not so much income equality in itself that is important, rather it is the risk of damaging self-esteem, while inflating pride.

4. Limiting poverty

It is not just relative income equality that is required by citizenship. Citizenship also demands an absolute ban on poverty, in the sense that poverty means a state of need which overtakes the individual’s capacity to function as a free and independent citizen.

I neither say nor maintain that kings should be called rich any more than the common folk who go through the streets on foot, for sufficiency equals wealth, and covetousness equals poverty.

(Guillaume de Lorris) & Jean de Muin, The Romance of Rose

Citizenship helps us here in two ways. First it provides another important reason for protecting socio-economic rights, but in a different way. The imperative to end poverty requires that an absolute minimum be set which guarantees the possibility for free and active contribution. Such freedom from poverty becomes the condition which frees us for practical citizenship – not slavery.

As Aristotle says: You could no more make a city out of paupers than out of slaves

Furthermore the question of what constitutes poverty and what, therefore, constitutes the level of income and support necessary to overcome poverty, becomes central to the design of the welfare state.

In the UK at least the design of the welfare state fails to address either poverty or inequality. Public policy-makers have become very relaxed about excessive wealth, and have convinced themselves that excessive wealth fuels productivity – despite all the evidence to the contrary. Moreover poverty is defined relatively, and so is treated as an absolute fact, which can only be mitigated, but not ended. This is an error.

5. The exercise of freedom

Citizens don’t just have rights and responsibilities, they also have freedoms. Citizenship should be a creative engagement with other citizens; and through this engagement new forms of community life evolve. Unfortunately this fact is not recognised in the design of most welfare systems.

While the existence of the welfare state is often defended by means of the rights of citizens it seems like the design of the welfare state is dictated by the needs and interests of the powerful. Often it seems like a new form of aristocratic rule has evolved within the welfare state itself.

The most extreme example of this can be found in the treatment of people with disabilities. Many people find that their lives are dictated by the welfare state: where people live, who people live with, what people do with their time, what people own and earn – everything is fixed by the state. Other groups may have some more freedom, but they still find their experience of the welfare state stigmatising and damaging: receiving benefit payments, negotiating confused bureaucracies and entering crisis before any assistance is received. Even more, universal services, like education, are highly centralised and standardised – not defined by a partnership of teachers and families – but by the political elite.

People with disabilities have led the way in demonstrating that this pattern of state-controlled welfare is unnecessary and inconsistent with citizenship. The battle to convert social work services into reasonable entitlements, under the control of individuals or families, has been being fought since the 1960s and has led to significant improvement in people’s life experiences.

In public policy there is still a resistance to seeing the exercise of freedom as an aspect of citizenship. These ideas are associated with neo-liberalism or the invasion of the market into the public sphere. But for those interesting in defending the welfare state this seems a risky strategy. It should be the defenders of citizenship who seek to extend freedom to citizens, even when this requires increased accountability and flexibility from the welfare state itself.

6. The role of civil society

Another curious lacuna in our thinking about welfare is the limited role given to civil society. And by civil society here I mean all the institutions and forms of community activity that exist in between the family and the state.

There has lately of course been a great focus on privatisation – an increased role being given to commercial bodies to provide welfare services – and this does involve a partial recognition of the role of civil society. But the language and focus of privatisation has again been rooted in liberal and utilitarian models of public policy.

Again advocates of citizenship can again find themselves in a confused and constrained rhetorical space. They may be critical of state welfare, but then they are also fearful of how state welfare slips into being a new partnership between the state and large commercial companies. There is a sense that the elite of state employees are now making common cause with the elite  of commerce. Often these people turn out to be friends, people who went to the same schools and universities and who also know each other socially.

It seems to me that we need to restore for ourselves greater respect for civil society as a distinct space – what some people call ‘the commons’ – the area we all own, together.

On a recent trip to Athens I was struck by the discovery that the ancient agora was marked off from private property by a series of sacred markers. The purpose of these markers was to forbid private ownership and protect the limits of the agora. Also, it was interesting to note that the place of political assembly was not in the agora, but on a hill over-looking the agora. Within the agora people did deals, taught, prayed, sold things – it was a permissive and flexible space – with plenty of commercial elements. But it was a purely public space.

Without such spaces – agoras – we cannot exercise our citizenship. It would be interesting to explore the consequences of a more spatial approach to public policy and citizenship.

7. The role of government

The other striking feature of the the citizen in the welfare state today is how undemocratic the system has become. Three things are striking:

  • The modern welfare state tends to be centralised, and – at least in the UK – has become increasingly centralised over time.
  • The welfare state is subject to bureaucratic and regulatory control – it is not accountable through democratic, market or communal processes.
  • The party political system is increasingly distorting the proper functions of the welfare state for narrow electoral reasons and to pander to key electoral groups.

In other words we are not citizens, in charge of our own government, we are consumers of welfare services designed and delivered by political elites.

This was precisely the end that G K Chesterton foresaw in his keen intellectual battles with the great Fabian George Bernard Shaw. While Shaw argued that the state, and its elites, were the inevitable guardians and managers of the welfare state Chesterton argued that this would leave ordinary citizens disempowered, without rights and property:

It is characteristic of his [G B Shaw] school, of his age. The morality he represents is above all the morality of negations. Just as it says you must not drink wine at all as the only solution to a few people drinking too much; just as it would say you must not touch meat or smoke tobacco at all.

Let us always remember, therefore, that when Mr Shaw says he can persuade all men to give up the sentiment of Private Property, it is in exactly the same hopeful spirit that he says he will get all of you to give up meat, tobacco, beer, and vast number of other things.

G K Chesterton, Do We Agree? 

Chesterton’s point is all the more powerful today, when the UK stands as the country with the greatest level of debt per head. We don’t own property, we are burdened by debt – one of the oldest routes to slavery.

Finally

Of course we may prefer slavery, debt, consumerism and passivity, instead of citizenship. Citizenship may seem like hard work. But we will find that, without citizenship, the welfare state we come to rely on will become increasingly less reliable.

Citizenship as a Moral Ideal

There are different ways of understanding the idea of citizenship. One of the most important distinctions is between those who think of citizenship as a status given to the individual by a community (passport-citizenship) and those who think of citizenship as a moral ideal that exists whether or not it is recognised by the community.

We can see this distinction clearly if we consider the following problem:

A community exists on an island – all the members of this community are citizens. They acknowledge their equal status as citizens and take seriously their duties as citizens and have regard for each other’s rights. One day a man is washed ashore on the island. He is clearly a foreigner, he has lost his home and all his possessions. He cannot even speak the native tongue. Is this man a citizen?

If you think of citizenship as just a badge – as defined and limited by membership of the pre-existing community then the answer is obvious: No. This man is the very opposite of a citizen. If he is owed anything at all it is not rooted in citizenship but in some other moral obligation.

But if you think of citizenship as a moral ideal then the answer is the complete opposite: Yes, this man is a citizen and just as much a citizen as every other member of the community. He is entitled to all the benefits of citizenship and must be supported to participate and to engage as a citizen. He is a citizen – disguised as a non-citizen and our duty is to take off the disguise.

We might note in passing that the same would not be true of holiday-makers or colonists who are either passing through or who aim to take over the land. However an economic migrant who abandons his home to come to live somewhere better might also be said to be a citizen. Although this might also lead us explore our global responsibility to the welfare of other communities.

This issue reveals a significant division in the idea of citizenship.

Those who doubt that morality is real or who see morality as secondary to our political and social settlements may well prefer passport-citizenship. For it is less demanding both metaphysically and practically. However it is seriously flawed and does not provide the right basis for moral or political thinking.

I think there are three reasons we must reject passport-citizenship:

1. The precedence of morality

Morality is real and it precedes any political or social settlement. Morality enables us to judge societies from the outside, without it we are left the victim of the norms of our society – however flawed they may be. If citizenship is just passport-citizenship then we have no basis to judge the way in which the rights of Jews or people with disabilities were stripped from them during the eugenics period.

Of course this argument is controversial and is best disputed within the arenas of philosophy and theology. However there will be some who say that they owe nothing to the man who is not part of their community because the only laws or norms they recognise are the those defined by their community.

2. The nature of charity

Of course most people would accept we owe the stranger something. But it is quite common for people to feel that any such obligation will be in some sense a lesser obligation. In fact this feeling is derived from a certain appropriate feature of the moral life: we do have special duties to ourselves, to special people and to our communities. After all each of us has our own family and own community and we cannot do justice to our duties by dissolving them into one general duty.

However it is important that such proper discrimination is not corrupted into clubbishness: only my people matter.

In our story the stranger has nobody to fall back onto. He has no family or community and so our obligation to him cannot be reduced in the expectation that other’s will help. So the question is whether or not we can reduce our obligations simply because the stranger seems not to be a citizen.

Here it is worth considering here what it is to help someone. The danger in any discussions of giving is that we tend to rather focus on the cost to the giver, rather than the purpose of the giving. Often this provokes the fear that to give is to lose and to give absolutely is to potentially lose everything. However this is not what is implicit in giving properly.

The best analysis of the nature of giving that I am aware of is provided by Maimonides in his analysis of the Eight Degrees of Charity. Starting with the highest form of giving Maimonides states:

There are eight levels in charity, each level surpassing the other. The highest level, beyond which there is none, is a person who supports a Jew who has fallen into poverty [by] giving him a present or a loan, entering into partnership with him, or finding him work so that his hand shall be fortified so that he will not have to ask others [for alms]. Concerning this [Leviticus 25:35] states “You shall support him, the stranger, the resident, and he shall live among you.” Implied is that you should support him before he falls and becomes needy.

Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Sefer Zeraim, Hilchot Matnot, Aniyim: 7-14

In other words equal citizenship describes the goal and character of perfect giving, even to someone who may not at first seem a citizen. Our goal is not to just give away something that we think is ‘ours’ but instead to ensure that the person is able to ‘live amongst us’ and ideally the way in which we give assistance should also reinforce respect for the person’s innate dignity. In fact, if you follow Maimonides analysis to the end, you would find that the the quality of charity is reduced as it becomes increasingly stigmatising and disrespectful.

So, I would argue that if you recognise the true nature of your obligation to the stranger you will find that you must treat the individual with respect and as an equal. In other words the ideal of citizenship lies submerged in our basic obligation to take care of the stranger even when they do not seem a citizen.

3. The nature of community

The final reason for rejecting passport-citizenship is that it kills the very nature of community itself. A community that defines itself by its existing members and which jealously guards its boundaries will become sterile and incapable of valuing even its own members. Whereas a community that treats the stranger as a citizen is a stronger community, not just in its respect for the demands of justice, but also in its capacity to be the kind of community that is capable of nurturing all its members.

I think this is where the focus on rights and citizenship is a little misleading. Not that rights are not important, they are essential – but they are not strictly fundamental. A one-eyed focus on rights will mistake the very nature of the community that aims to respect those rights.

Rights only exist because duties exist. As Simone Weil puts it:

The notion of obligation comes before that of rights, which is subordinate and relative to the former. A right is not effectual by itself, but only in relation to the obligation to which it corresponds, the effective exercise of a right springing not from the individual who possesses it, but from other men who consider themselves as being under a certain obligation to him. Recognition of an obligation makes it effectual. An obligation which goes unrecognised by anybody loses none of the full force of its existence. A right which goes unrecognised by anybody is not worth very much…

Simone Weil, The Need for Roots

Often this same point is made by those who want to limit the demand of rights. They drift from the correct observation that each effective right must be matched by some real duty, to the incorrect observation that therefore we must limit the set of rights and impose the minimal set of duties upon ourselves – in the name of freedom, private property or political necessity.

This is a very live political issues today, for example the Australian politician Joe Hockey recently wrote:

I wish to thank my friends at the Institute of Economic Affairs for the opportunity to discuss an issue that has been the source of much debate in this forum for sometime… that is, the end of an era of popular universal entitlement. There is nothing much new in the debate other than the fact that action has now been forced on governments as a result of the recent financial crisis. Years of warnings have been ignored but the reality can no longer be avoided.

Joe Hockey, The End of the Age of Entitlement.

But duties are not costs. Duties simply articulate the form of the good life.

Some duties are certainly constraints, forbidding things which will damage the negative rights of others (e.g. the right to life, the right to property). Some duties place upon us positive responsibilities, enabling other people to have positive rights (e.g. the right to assistance, income, employment). In addition, as Kant observed, some duties are perfect – in the sense that it is absolutely clear whether or not we are achieving the duty (Kant). Others imperfect – in sense that we can fulfil our duties to different degrees and with more or less discretion.

In addition our duties evolve and develop along with our form of life and our relationships with others. It is our relationships with others that place demands upon us – but those demands are not costs – they are the reciprocal connections by which the individual and the community develops.

Imagine a person free of all duties and you imagine someone who is utterly disconnected.

The structure of our duties describes the framework within which the good life is lived. There are still spaces that allow for discretion, creativity, enjoyment and licence. But it is the framework of duties that makes life possible and makes life meaningful. Pure licence is emptiness.

As Kant also observed the sense of burden we associate with duty is also an illusion. For the sense of duty as a burden is only how experience what we should do when it is not what we want to do. But often our duties are exactly what we want to do and the good life is not a life without duty, but a life rich with duties – that can be fulfilled.

We have now to elucidate the concept of a will estimable in itself and good apart from any further end. This concept, which is already present in a sound natural understanding and requires not so much to be taught as merely to be clarified, always holds the highest place in estimating the total worth of our actions and constitutes the condition of all the rest. We will therefore take up the concept of duty, which includes that of a good will, exposed however, to certain subjective limitations and obstacles. These so far from hiding a good will or disguising it, rather bring it out by contrast and make it shine forth more brightly.

Kant I, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals

From a Christian perspective we might also say that acting merely from duty is simply the form that love takes when we are not blessed with the rights feelings.

In other words to deny citizenship to the absolute stranger is to weaken community. We fail in the exercise of our duties, we fail to give the stranger the opportunity to contribute to the communities network of relationships, and we fail to strengthen the exchange of gifts of citizenship.

A decent community is awake to the ideal of citizenship. Citizenship serves to frame the obligations of the community to its members and to the welcome it gives to others. Citizenship is both a discipline and an ideal.

Citizenship is a powerful moral standard which can be applied to social and political arrangements. It is a standard, not just of rights, but more importantly a standard for duty, virtue and social purpose (telos).

If we do this we will find ourselves exploring the possibility that rather than being ruled by one, or by a few, we will be ruled by ourselves – for this is how Aristotle defines citizenship:

A citizen is one who has a share in both ruling and being ruled.

Aristotle, Politics III 1

Of course some who embrace citizenship merely do so to keep at arms length those they fear or do not want to join them in community. But just because some misuse the concept doesn’t mean the concept should be abandoned. Citizenship is the means by which we can live as equals, in all our differences. Properly understood it is a vital moral ideal by which to challenge the current social and political system.

The Blood Money of Charity or Why Entitlements Matter

If the present order is taken for granted or assumed to be sacrosanct, charity from the more to the less fortunate would seem virtuous and commendable; to those for whom the order itself is suspect or worse, such charity is blood-money. Why should some be in the position to dispense and others to need that kind of charity?

An infidel could ignore that challenge; for apart from faith in God there is really nothing to be said for the notion of human equality. Men do not seem to be equal in any respect, if we judge by available evidence. But if all are are children of one Father, then all are equal heirs of a status in comparison with which apparent differences of quality and capacity are unimportant; in the deepest and most important of all – their relationship to God – all are equal.

William Temple, Christianity and Social Order

This quote perhaps helps remind us that the Church has often been a powerful advocate of real social justice. Archbishop Temple does not seek to position the Church as a bestower of charity; instead he demands that society recognises the genuine rights that are created by our human needs.

He also reminds us that equality is the foundation of social justice – we simply are equal – in some profound moral sense – despite all our obvious and great differences. This fundamental equality of moral worth is central to our moral codes (whether or not you believe in God). There is also an aspiration that many of us share – to live ‘as equals’ in a community where those differences can be reconciled through our equal citizenship. The barriers to such social equality are great indeed – but the moral appeal of such equality is hard to erode – despite all the prejudice, discrimination and injustice that is such a feature of the modern world.

An example of this battle for equality is the conflict over ‘entitlements’ that rages around people with disabilities internationally. In the UK today the entitlement to social care is under a double attack: (a) funding for that entitlement is being cut by 33% (from 2010 to 2015) and (b) many local authorities are now undermining a policy position which had treated ‘personal budgets’ as the person’s money – an entitlement. Instead people find their control eroded by increasing regulations, bureaucracy and direct interference.

On the other side of the world, Australia, as it begins to implement its National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS), is making a globally important commitment to secure the rights of persons with disabilities in line with the UN Declaration and the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. However, even in this context, policy-makers struggle with the idea that disabled people are actually owed the intended budgets – that these budgets are entitlements which belong to people:

“It’s Jack’s money, not the government’s money.”

I will not rehearse here all the arguments for treating such funding as an entitlement (I have done it elsewhere and I have the feeling I will have to have another go soon). I simply want to observe the starkness of the choice:

If we give people money they are either entitled to it or they are not. If they are not entitled to it then why are we giving it? We would be giving what we ought not to give. If they are entitled to it then it is theirs – not ours.

What is at stake here – as Temple rightly observes – is whether we are giving people what they are properly due, or whether we are just giving the blood money of charity.

The Good Samaritan

On one occasion an expert in the law stood up to test Jesus. “Teacher,” he asked, “what must I do to inherit eternal life?”

 “What is written in the Law?” he replied. “How do you read it?”

He answered, “‘Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your strength and with all your mind’; and, ‘Love your neighbour as yourself.’”

“You have answered correctly,” Jesus replied. “Do this and you will live.”

But he wanted to justify himself, so he asked Jesus, “And who is my neighbour?”

In reply Jesus said:

“A man was going down from Jerusalem to Jericho, when he was attacked by robbers. They stripped him of his clothes, beat him and went away, leaving him half dead. A priest happened to be going down the same road, and when he saw the man, he passed by on the other side. So too, a Levite, when he came to the place and saw him, passed by on the other side. But a Samaritan, as he traveled, came where the man was; and when he saw him, he took pity on him. He went to him and bandaged his wounds, pouring on oil and wine. Then he put the man on his own donkey, brought him to an inn and took care of him. The next day he took out two denarii and gave them to the innkeeper. ‘Look after him,’ he said, ‘and when I return, I will reimburse you for any extra expense you may have.’

“Which of these three do you think was a neighbour to the man who fell into the hands of robbers?”

The expert in the law replied, “The one who had mercy on him.”

Jesus told him, “Go and do likewise.”

Luke: 10: 25-37

One way of bring this story up to date is to replace Samaritan with Palestinian.

Does the Jew have the right to be assisted by the Samaritan? Does the Samaritan have a Duty to assist the Jew? Although we might want to say assistance is a ‘good thing’ it might seem initially implausible to treat it as a matter of Rights or Duties. [Or we might want to say its a different kind of Right or Duty – I think some people call this a ‘duty from beneficence’ – but I’m not sure if this is what they really mean.]

First of all here is what we can say to support this feeling of implausibility:

  1. Rights and Duties imply Law, and Law means politics, policing, and prisons – in other words the only point to reference to these heavy-weight concepts is to bring in the weight of the law – enforcement. But our moral life must not be too closely connected to the Law (a) different things are important to different people and so cannot be legislated for (b) and many important things, like love, involve morality but would still be damaged by heavy-handed interference by the Law.
  2. We want to value the act of assistance but we don’t want to start demanding too much of people. How would we get anything done if people’s right to assistance trumped all the other valuable things we wanted to do? Duties are burdens and we don’t want to let them grow too big and we certainly don’t want then to adhere to us just because we happened to be passing by.
  3. Why should the Samaritan have to help the Jew who despise him. We might accept that the Jew has the right to assistance from other Jews – but there can be no right to assistance from Samaritans.

Despite this feeling of implausibility the truth is that the Jew has a right to assistance and the Samaritan has the duty.

Christ does not call his benefactors loving or charitable. He calls them just. The Gospel makes no distinction between the love of our neighbour and justice. In the eyes of the Greeks also a respect for Zeus the suppliant was the first duty of justice. We have invented the distinction between justice and charity. It is easy to understand why. Our notion of justice dispenses him who possesses from the obligation of giving. If he gives, all the same, he thinks he has a right to be pleased with himself. He thinks he has done good work. As for him who receives, it depends on the way he interprets this notion whether he is dispensed from all gratitude, or whether it obliges him to offer servile thanks.

Only the absolute identification of justice and love makes the co-existence possible of compassion and gratitude on the one hand, and on the other, of respect for the dignity of affliction in the afflicted – a respect felt by the sufferer himself and the others.

It has to be recognised that no kindness can go further than justice without constituting a fault under a false appearance of kindness. But the just must be thanked for being just, because justice is so beautiful a thing, in the same way we thank God because of his great glory. Any other gratitude is servile and even animal.

Simone Weil, Waiting on God, p. 97

So let us see if we can deal with the counter-arguments:

1. Disconnecting Law and Morals

On the view of Weil, which I support, Duty and Right precede the Law. The Law is informed by our Rights and Duties, but it is not going to exactly mirror our Rights and Duties. Of course this means distinguishing a Legal Duty or Right and a Moral Duty or Right. But this is as it should be. The Law can be unjust and I can therefore, sometimes, reject the Law. If we make the Law primary we would not be able to evaluate the Law – this would mean that Law could never be Just because it could never be evaluated – morally – by Justice itself.

This view can also reconcile the worries we have about the limitations of the Law. Moral Duties and Rights don’t mirror the Legal but they do extend into other areas of the Moral Life:

a) Many of my Duties are highly personal to me, they may be linked to my choices, vocation, self-development or much else. The Law may or may not offer a helpful discipline to the fulfilment of my Duties. Freedom is not a moral-free zone.

b) Many Duties flow from features of relationships that are outside the reach of Law. Some of the Duties of a husband cannot be legislated for. In other areas relationships do give rise to contractual Rights and Duties.

This raises an interesting question. If the Law is not Justice then what role is there for the Law? If Justice is primary and precedes the Law then there is no reason to expect that Law will merely try to enforce Just behaviour. It may be wiser to ask the Law to do less work. It is not plausible that the Law is always the best means to promote the development of the virtuous person, to encourage self-development or good relationships. The Law may undermine virtue by either intruding where it has no place or in over-specifying human behaviour. The Law is necessary, but clumsy.

2. The Ending of Charity

Weil’s concern is that by trying to separate out moral Duties from some other weaker category of good deeds we are simply letting ourselves off the hook and misrepresenting our relationship with the Right-holder.

There is also the risk – as Weil also notices – of giving too much and this is also an important part of her argument. In human relationships doing good is a fine balance where we can do too much as well as do too little. The challenge is to do what is right – not just to do good.

3. The Universality of Love

It is certainly easier to assist those to whom we are joined in community and our communal relationships may also create very specific Duties – like paying taxes. But it is of the very nature of Justice that it is universal; we must face our Duties despite their costs and difficulties. Duties are, on this reading, simply an aspect of Love.

And here is Dorothy L Sayers on duty and love:

The creative will presses on to Its end, regardless of what It may suffer by the way. It does not choose suffering, but It will not avoid it, and must expect it. We say that It is Love, and “sacrifices” Itself for what It loves; and this is true, provided we understand what we mean by sacrifice. Sacrifice is what it looks like to other people, but to That-which-Loves I think its does not appear so. When one really cares, the self-is forgotten, and the sacrifice becomes only part of the activity. Ask yourself: If there is something you supremely want to do, do you count as “self-sacrifice” the difficulties encountered or other possible activities cast aside? You do not. The time when you deliberately say, “I must sacrifice this, that or the other” is when you do not supremely desire the end in view. At such times you are doing your duty, and that is admirable, but it is not love. But as soon as your duty becomes your love “self-sacrifice” is taken for granted, and, whatever the world calls it, you call it so no longer.

So, in summary, we should not expect to see all our Rights and Duties mirrored in legal Duties and Rights. Nor should we seek some kind of softer and less demanding form of moral obligation – kindness or charity. It is morality itself that must underpin and interrogate the Law. Morality is experienced though love and, when we are not feeling so loving, through Duty.

The Right to be Different

Human groupings have one main purpose: to assert everyone’s right to be different, to be special, to think, feel and live in his or her own way. People join together in order to win or defend this right. But this is where a terrible, fateful error is born: the belief that these groupings in the name of a race, a God, a party or a State are the very purpose of life and not simply a means to an end. No! the only true and lasting meaning of the struggle for life lies in the individual, in his modest peculiarities and in his right to these peculiarities.

Vasily Grossman in Life and Fate

I like this thought. Political philosophers rarely assert the value of this right – the right to be different.

Some, like Hobbes, see society as developing out of our basic needs for protection. Others, like Locke, see it as the rational requirement of our fundamental rights. Burke and other’s might see society as having a value in itself, as the transmitter of values through the generations. But rarely do philosophers proclaim the value of difference itself.

Grossman’s point is useful because he sees that the individual’s proper commitment to the group must be a reflection of the needs of individuality itself – it is my unique place in community that I expect society to respect and sustain. If society cannot respect and support that very individuality why must I support it? If I must become not I in order to be valued and protected then I have no reason to commit myself to society.

It is curious how careless we are of diversity and true individuality in our thinking about society. All too quickly some rationale becomes the new god for society – and we must sacrifice ourselves for that artificial idol. I think that part of the reason that Judaism was so opposed to idols was precisely to protect the individual from this kind of mad social coercion.

The Duty to Restore People to Their Duties

Recall the face of the poorest and the most helpless man whom you may have seen and ask yourself, if the step you contemplate is going to be of any use to him. Will he be able to gain anything by it? Will it restore him to control over his own life and destiny? In other words, will it lead to Swaraj or self-rule for the hungry and also spiritually starved millions of our countrymen? then you will find your doubts and yourself melting away.

Gandhi

Notice how Gandhi understands the importance of freedom or self-rule in his account of the experience of justice. Meeting the basic need is important, but meeting the need in a way that is absorbed into respect for the innate dignity and integrity of the other human being is central to a proper understanding of justice. Otherwise people become the mere means by which we fulfil our obligations – our real duty is to restore to people to their full role and to put people in a position to meet their own obligations.

Why Austerity is a Lie (updated)

[I updated this blog in November 2013 with more recent data and graphs.]

I find the repeated use of the word austerity very annoying. It implies that what is happening in the UK today is unfortunate – but somewhat accidental – like an act of God. But what we face is not austerity, it is a targeted assault on the rights of disabled people and people in poverty. The targeting takes at least 3 forms:

First the primary economic problem has been created by debt. But not everybody’s debt is equal. It is the debt of the home owner that is the most powerful cause of the economic crisis in the UK. And this debt is the logical counter-part to the enormous economic bubble in house prices that has made some people very wealthy, put others in deep housing debt and left others outside the house ownership system altogether. As the economist Lester Thurow pointed out many years ago – inflation is always a form of theft. The problems we face are rooted in inequalities of wealth and the irrationalities of greed which nobody wants to talk about.

This graphic shows the impact of reducing the base rate of interest down to 0.5 – an extraordinary annual subsidy to the better off:

Second the government’s response to this problem has primarily been to avoid letting the economic house price bubble burst. The worst political outcome is perceived to be that those people in housing debt should have to pay what they owe and that those inflated house prices should tumble. Hence these debtors are subsidised by pumping money into the banks that have made these bad loans and by trying to sustain an incredibly low interest rate – one that is killing the value of savings. The government hopes to pay for this subsidy to home owners and financiers by cutting back on public expenditure elsewhere. We are responding to a problem caused by inequality by increasing the level of inequality.

Here is the housing bubble – a 360% increase in house prices in just 11 years:

However, thirdly, the government faces the further risk that those important swing voters (most of whom are home owners) will also react negatively to seeing ‘popular’ welfare services cut. Hence the services that must be targeted for cutting are those that are just for the poor and disabled people. These are the unpopular, unknown or stigmatised public services – benefits, social care and vital community services for women and families. So, those who did not cause our problems must pay for their solution.

I have recently done another analysis of this:

  • 42% of all cuts fall on the 20% of the population who are poor
  • 27% of all cuts fall on the 8% of the population who have a disability
  • 17% of all cuts fall on the 2% of the population with severe disabilities

This calculation does not even take account of inflation or the impact of increased taxes, like VAT and social care charges, that also target the poorest.

The cuts are represented in the following graph:

 

 

You do not need a good understanding of economics to see the madness and injustice of this approach. Inevitably, saving money by targeting the poorest with more taxes and by reducing their incomes is not going to work – they have very little money to steal – and ultimately this policy will only lead to other expensive social problems. But long-term logic is a luxury for politicians who are just desperate to win the next election – at any cost.

Another way of identifying the real meaning of our current situation is to remember the marketing maxim – if your product has a weakness then pretend that it is a strength and positively promote it. So we have the rhetoric of the ‘squeezed middle’ and the ‘welfare lifestyle’. Politicians invert reality and distort truth in order to fabricate reality into a more electorally satisfactory form. Or, as Joseph Goebbels supposedly put it: If you tell a lie big enough and keep repeating it, people will eventually come to believe it. [Interestingly this quote is probably not authentic; and it certainly seems implausible that Goebbels would reveal his own strategy – nevertheless his strategy was certainly effective – for a time.]

Of course, if austerity were just some kind of accidental or shared social problem – not a politically designed strategy that targets the most vulnerable – then our response would also be very different. If we were simply making up for some accidental shortfall in the public purse then we could either (a) increase those taxes that fell equally on everyone (e.g. income tax) or (b) reduce the cost of public services by asking everyone to take a small pay cut. It is interesting to notice that the groups that benefit from this targeting strategy are not only the better off – they also include many who are in the middle and who are being encouraged to blame the poor for poverty.

One of the challenges for those of us in the Campaign for a Fair Society is to try and get people to understand that the unfairness of these cuts lies not so much in their severity but more in the way that they target those with the least ability to defend themselves. It is for this reason I think we should all refuse to use a word like austerity. We must not allow language to be used to distort reality – we must underline the choices that are being made by our political leaders. Even if this means that people will also have to accept that many of the problems we face are very much of our own making.

So instead of cuts, austerity, the recession or other misleading terms – remember – what we face is the targeting of disabled people, the targeting of the poor, and the purposeful creation of greater inequality.

You can read more on how cuts target disabled people in our latest report – A Fair Society?

Justice and Charity

Christ does not call his benefactors loving or charitable. He calls them just. The Gospel makes no distinction between the love of our neighbour and justice. In the eyes of the Greeks also a respect for Zeus the suppliant was the first duty of justice. We have invented the distinction between justice and charity. It is easy to understand why. Our notion of justice dispenses him who possesses from the obligation of giving. If he gives, all the same, he thinks he has a right to be pleased with himself. He thinks he has done good work. As for him who receives, it depends on the way he interprets this notion whether he is dispensed from all gratitude, or whether it obliges him to offer servile thanks.

Only the absolute identification of justice and love makes the co-existence possible of compassion and gratitude on the one hand, and on the other, of respect for the dignity of affliction in the afflicted – a respect felt by the sufferer himself and the others.

It has to be recognised that no kindness can go further than justice without constituting a fault under a false appearance of kindness. But the just must be thanked for being just, because justice is so beautiful a thing, in the same way we thank God because of his great glory. Any other gratitude is servile and even animal.

Simone Weil from Forms of the Implicit Love of God in Waiting on God

Many of us are suspicious of charity, because it is a kind of patronage where the giver is powerful and the recipient is powerless; the giver is to be thanked and the recipient is pitiable. Weil sees the same problem, but also from the direction of charity itself. If charity is an act of love then it must be welcomed – for love is the lifeblood of the universe. It is central to our proper nature – however when we split charity away from justice trouble begins: the recipient is no longer entitled – as a matter of justice – to what we give. Our giving comes from being extra-nice – the bounty of the rich and powerful.

However some worry about giving too much priority to justice, to rights and obligations. They worry that this is to cut love out of the picture. How can love be about rights and duties?

Another interesting quote from Dorothy Leigh Sayers approaches this same problem:

The creative will presses on to Its end, regardless of what It may suffer by the way. It does not choose suffering, but It will not avoid it, and must expect it. We say that It is Love, and “sacrifices” Itself for what It loves; and this is true, provided we understand what we mean by sacrifice. Sacrifice is what it looks like to other people, but to That-which-Loves I think its does not appear so. When one really cares, the self-is forgotten, and the sacrifice becomes only part of the activity. Ask yourself: If there is something you supremely want to do, do you count as “self-sacrifice” the difficulties encountered or other possible activities cast aside? You do not. The time when you deliberately say, “I must sacrifice this, that or the other” is when you do not supremely desire the end in view. At such times you are doing your duty, and that is admirable, but it is not love. But as soon as your duty becomes your love “self-sacrifice” is taken for granted, and, whatever the world calls it, you call it so no longer.

Dorothy Leigh Sayers from What Do We Believe, Unpopular Opinions (1940)

I think Sayers observation helps us see that love only becomes a matter of mere duty when it no longer drives us. We are merely ‘doing our duty.’ But whether from love or duty the right remains the same. The person for whom we act is fully entitled to our assistance – but we won’t notice that entitlement because we act from love.

Justice remains central. It stops us from patronising those who need our help – their needs create entitlements and we have no right to feel pleased with ourselves for doing our duty. But it does not exclude love – we can do our duty and yet have no awareness that we are merely doing our duty. It remains our duty, even when we act from love.

Human Rights for Disabled People

“Far am I from denying in theory; full as far is my heart from withholding in practice… the real rights of men… If civil society be made for the advantage of man, all the advantages for which it is made become his right… Whatever each man can separately do, without trespassing upon others, he has a right to do for himself; and he has a right to a fair portion of all which society, with all its combinations of skill and force, can do in his favour.”

Edmund Burke from Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790)

There is a debate in political theory and in practical politics about the value of rights. There are at least two traditions opposed to taking rights seriously:

1. The radical statists – thinkers like Jeremy Bentham and Karl Marx didn’t like the way in which rights could be used to get in the way of whatever it was they thought was in the ‘true interests of society’. They saw rights as backward looking – protecting the interests of the few against their own enlightened concern for the many. The modern version of this is found in Fabianism and Neo-Liberalism.

2. The conservative tradition – thinkers like Edmund Burke were fearful of the unexpected damage that ideas like Human Rights might bring about in a society when they had not been tested by experience – looking over the Channel at the blood being spilled in the name of Human Rights one can have some sympathy with this point of view.

While both these sceptical traditions may have some merit it is also interesting to note that they almost cancel each other. Attacks on Human Rights seems largely to be a defence of privilege. For the radical statists the hidden assumption is that they (the new and emerging elite) know best how the rest of us should live. The conservative tradition is largely concerned to defend the privileges of the old and threatened elite. Both views are only useful to those who form part of the elite.

In reality rights are the vital lifeblood of civil society – and it is a mistake to try and separate them from piety, virtue or duty as some thinkers do. As Simone Weil notes duties are inextricably bound up with rights (even if duties are logically prior to rights – as I have argue elsewhere):

“A man considered in isolation, only has duties, amongst which are certain duties towards himself. Other men, seen from his point of view, only have rights….”

The big question is not ‘whether rights’ – the big question is ‘what rights’. This is a truth that Edmund Burke himself recognised. This is why the tradition of Human Rights is essential – even if it inevitably challenges existing patterns of civil rights. Human Rights are not a panacea, but they are a useful way of interrogating the existing pattern of rights – the actual laws, customs and systems of our society. As Burke recognised we need rights in order to distribute the “fair portion of all which society, with all its combinations of skill and force, can do in his favour” – this is never a simple matter and it is certainly subject to change.

A good example of this is the current debate on the application of human rights to the lives of disabled people. Our current law and systems are built on dreadful negative assumptions about disabled people. They provide for some cold charity and care, but they do not support people’s real Human Rights. They reflect two centuries of prejudice and oppression – so there is no reason to expect that the current patterns of civil rights are adequate protection for the real status of disabled people – as equal citizens.

We also know much more about how to combine “skill and force” to provide a “fair portion” for all citizens. For instance, we know that inclusion, citizenship and independent living create a better world for everyone. So we recognise – with even greater urgency – the moral case for the radical reform of our current welfare system – particularly the systems that impact on disabled people.

Human Rights are not enough, as Hannah Arendt noted when discussing the Eichman trial:

“For Israel the only unprecedented feature of the trial was that, for the first time (since the year 70, when Jerusalem was destroyed by the Romans), Jews were able to sit in judgement on crimes committed against their own people, that for the first time they did not need to appeal to others for protection and justice, or fall back upon the compromised phraseology of the rights of man – rights which, as no one knew better than they, were claimed only by people who were too weak to defend their “rights of Englishmen” and to enforce their own laws.”

It is time that the human rights of disabled people are turned into real civil rights – “the rights of Englishmen.”

Exiles

Imagine a man who washes up on a desert island. He has all he needs, but then new people arrive on what he thinks of as ‘his island’. We can identify at least 4 different kinds of cases that each demand a different response:

Colonists – people who come to take over. He would reject any rights they claimed absolutely if he understood that they came to take ownership away from him.

Holiday-makers – people who come, but not to stay. They would be his guests, but he would want them to behave appropriately. They can go home – they are here for their pleasure (not to build a world) their rights would be limited.

Migrants – people who want to leave their old home, and who want to live with him – to build a world with him – although they still have a home. They should be made welcome as equals (ceteris paribus) – after all, they must judge that they can build a better world here than where they used to call home.

Exiles and Refugees – a man with no home, no one to go home to, no power and no rights is automatically at home when he lands on the island. His rights are as strong as the first man’s rights – in fact the first man is under a powerful obligation to help him settle – at his own expense.

The exile is our equal – a complete stranger to the land – has no other home than our home – and so is our complete and utter equal in rights and citizenship.

Educational Totalitarianism

Article 26 of the Declaration of Human Rights

(1) Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit. 

(2) Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace. 

(3) Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children.

This all makes good sense to me – but it is not how our actual education system works.

Each time that someone tries to fix the final purpose of education then they are engaged in a kind of totalitarian determination to fix the purpose of human life. They are wilfully trying to limit the ends of others by their own definition of what it is that human beings should learn, think and do. 

Good education implies freedom – faith in the unfolding of human potential. It does not require politicians to tell us what we should learn, how we should learn nor the purpose of our learning.

When the latest edict from the Department of Education tells us what the state intends to teach our children this week we should laugh at the absurdity of it all.

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